UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-2-2018

Severson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45780

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Severson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45780" (2018). Not Reported. 4797.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4797

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
10/2/2018 9:17 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LARRY M. SEVERSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

Case No. 45780-2018
D.Ct. No: CV-2009-1408
(Elmore County)

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho
In and For the County of Elmore

HONORABLE LYNN NORTON
District Judge, Presiding

John R. Kormanik
KORMANIK & SNEED LLP
206 W Jefferson St.
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 288-1888
Electronic Service: jrk@khsidaholaw.com
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................................... 1
A.

NATURE OF CASE ................................................................................................................. 1

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................... 1

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... 8
A.

Facts from Severson I ..................................................................................................... 8

B.

State’s Closing Argument ............................................................................................... 9

C.

Direct Appeal ................................................................................................................ 11

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................. 11
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................... 11
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 11

II.

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 12
A.

Applicable Standards. ................................................................................................... 12

B. The District Court Erred In Finding Certain Statements Were Considered On Direct
Appeal. .................................................................................................................................. 14
C. The District Court Erred In Concluding Statements It Found Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct Did Not Amount To Fundamental Error. .......................................................... 16
D. The District Court Erred In Concluding The Prosecutor’s Comment On Mr. Severson’s
Fifth Amendment Right To Silence Did Not Constitute Fundamental Error. ....................... 19
E. The District Court Erred In Concluding Certain Statements Did Not Constitute
Prosecutorial Misconduct. .................................................................................................... 20
F. The District Court Erred In Concluding There Was No Cumulative Error Because Of
Trial Counsel’s Failure To Object To Statements Which It Found Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct. ........................................................................................................................... 23
i

G. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Object To The Prosecutor’s “Relentless And Blatant Abuse
Of Power” Satisfies The Strickland Standard. Mr. Severson Received Ineffective Assistance
Of Trial Counsel. .................................................................................................................. 24
H. The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Severson Is Not Entitled To Relief
Because Appellate Counsel Was Constitutionally Ineffective. ............................................. 25
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 26
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 28

ii

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES
Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) .................................................... 15
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................................................................................. 21
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) ................................................................................... 25
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 161 (1986) ................................................................................ 25
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416, U.S. 637 (1974) ........................................................................ 25
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) ............................................................................................ 14
Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 363 P.3d 365 (2015) ................................................................ 12
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) ............................................................................. 14, 26
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................................................... 20
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 971 P.2d 727 (1998) .......................................................... 14, 15
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014).................................................................. 12
Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012) ................................................................................ 24, 25
People v. Jackson, 618 P.2d 149 (Cal. 1980) ............................................................................... 21
Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002) ....................................................................... 16
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ............................................................................ 14, 15
Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 363 P.3d 358 (2015) ....................................................... 5, 6, 16
State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 671 P.2d 1051 (1983).......................................................... 20, 21
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 71 P. 608 (1903) ................................................................................. 19
State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 85 P.3d 1109 (Ct. App. 2003) ...................................................... 19
State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 399 P.3d 804 (2017) ................................................... 13, 18, 22
State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 986 P.2d 323 (1999) .............................................................. 13

iii

State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 332 P.3d 767 (2014).................................................................... 18
State v. Ortiz, 148 Idaho 38, 218 P.3d 17 (Ct. App. 2009) ........................................................... 19
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho, 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) .................................................. 12, 22, 23, 24
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 948 P.2d 127 (1997) ................................................................... 19
State v. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 363 P.3d 339 (2015) ............................................................... 16
State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 294 P.3d 1137 (Ct. App. 2013) ............................................... 18
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ........................................................ passim
State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976) .................................................................... 20
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ................................................................... 27
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................................. 1, 13, 15
United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................. 20
United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................................................. 20
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........................................................ 14
United States v. Winsor, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Or. 2009)...................................................... 14
Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................ 19
STATUTES
Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(1).......................................................................................................... 12
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Idaho CONST. Art. 9, § 13 ............................................................................................................. 19
U.S. CONST. amend. V .................................................................................................................. 19
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV .................................................................................................. 14, 19, 24

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of Case
This matter is an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Severson’s Third
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief [on Remand] following an evidentiary
hearing. R. 45780-2018, Vol. 4, pp. 514-71.1 The district court’s dismissal is contained in its
Memorandum Decision Dismissing Post Conviction Petition After Evidentiary Hearing (on
Remand), issued January 23, 2018. R. 45780-2018, Vol. 5, pp. 832-74. Relief should be granted
because contrary to the district court’s findings: (1) trial counsel’s representation of Mr. Severson
at trial violated the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, and Mr. Severson was
prejudiced thereby because of trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (2)
appellate counsel’s representation of Mr. Severson violates the standards set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, and Mr. Severson suffered prejudice thereby because appellate counsel failed to raise
several instances of prosecutorial misconduct or, when he did, failed to support the offending
statement with argument and authority. In short, the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing Mr. Severson’s Third Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief [on
Remand]. That decision should be reversed, and Mr. Severson should be either granted a new trial
or a new appeal from his convictions.
B. Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Severson with poisoning his wife by tampering with her
Hydroxycut® capsules, inserting Drano® into the capsules, and first-degree murder – either by

1

In its Order Augmenting Appeal, dated March 2, 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court indicated certain documents from
Mr. Severson’s previous appeals would be included in the record of the instant appeal. Idaho Supreme Court Case
No. 32128 was Mr. Severson’s direct appeal from his criminal conviction in Elmore County Case No. CR-FE-2002158. Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40679 was Mr. Severson’s appeal from the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. For ease of reference, the record or transcript cited will contain the Idaho Supreme Court case
number.
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causing Ms. Severson to overdose on Ambien® and Unisom® or by suffocating her. R. 32128,
Vol. 3, pp. 377-78.
At trial, the State was unable to present evidence of a definitive cause of death; instead, its
forensic pathologist concluded the cause of death was “undetermined,” and the jury was not asked
to return a verdict unanimously agreeing to the means of death. Tr. 32182, Vol. 2, p. 1250, LL. 910; p. 1318, LL. 13-17. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) (hereinafter
Severson I). Following seventeen days of evidence and testimony, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty of poisoning and a general verdict of murder. Id., 215 P.3d 414. The district court sentenced
Mr. Severson to a term of imprisonment of fixed life on the murder conviction with a concurrent
sentence of five years for the poisoning conviction. R. 32182, Vol. 10, p. 3. He appealed, and the
Idaho Supreme Court, by a vote of 3-2 (Justice W. Jones and Justice pro tem Kidwell dissenting),
affirmed the convictions. Id., 215 P.3d 414. Although affirming Mr. Severson’s convictions, the
majority found some of the prosecutor’s closing argument statements “somewhat inflammatory
because they were likely designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury,” id. at p.
719, 215 P.3d at 439, and other statements were “arguably improper,” id. at p. 720, 215 P.3d at
440.
Justice W. Jones dissented on the following grounds:
I disagree with the majority’s analysis on whether the numerous and substantial
errors committed during trial require reversal pursuant to the cumulative error
doctrine … [and] the classification of the prosecutor’s misconduct during closing
arguments as not constituting fundamental error. I find the prosecutor’s conduct
relentless and a blatant abuse of power; time and time again the prosecutor
continued to engage in a pattern of conduct which waivered on and over the edge
of appropriate conduct.
Id. at p. 723, 215 P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J. dissenting). Justice pro tem Kidwell joined in the
dissent. Id., 215 P.3d at 443.
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On or about October 22, 2009, Mr. Severson filed, among other things, a pro-se Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief (“Initial Petition”) along with supporting documentation. R. 457802018, Vol. 1, pp. 17-36. Included in the claims contained in the Initial Petition was a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for “failure to object. [sic] During trial and during closing
arguments” as well as “cumulative error.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 25, 27. On or about December
11, 2009, the district court issued a Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Order
Appointing Counsel; a Conflict Public Defender was assigned. R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 37-47.
On or about April 18, 2011, this time with the assistance of counsel, Mr. Severson filed an
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter “Amended Verified Petition”).
R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 56-66. Included in the Amended Verified Petition, as the “Third Cause
of Action” was an allegation Mr. Severson’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
trial counsel was denied because trial counsel failed to object to “improper comments by the state
in closing argument.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 64-65. Mr. Severson also included a claim of
“cumulative error” as the “Fourth Cause of Action” in the Amended Verified Petition. R. 457802018, Vol.1, pp. 65-66. On or about August 5, 2011, the state filed its Answer to Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 71-89.
On or about February 13, 2012, the State filed its Motion for Order Granting Partial
Summary Dismissal along with a Memorandum in Support. R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 4, 98-142.
A hearing was held on the State’s Motion on May 9, 2012. Tr. 40769, Motion Hearing, May 9,
2012. During the hearing on said Motion, Mr. Severson informed the district court and the State
he was not waiving any of the claims asserted in the pro se Initial Petition and those claims were
in addition to the ones raised in the Amended Verified Petition. On or about June 8, 2012, the State
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filed its Second Motion for Summary Dismissal. Tr. 40769, Motion Hearing, May 9, 2012, p. 6, ll.
4-18.
On or about June 29, 2012, the district court issued its Partial Summary Dismissal of
Claims Related to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, pp. 172-206. Therein,
the district court addressed, among other things, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
trial counsel’s failure “to object to improper, prejudicial, and inflammatory remarks and statements
by the Prosecutor,” which was set forth in ¶ 64 of the Amended Verified Petition. The district court
dismissed any such claims based on its application of the doctrine of res judicata. R. 45780-2018,
Vol.1, p. 202.
On or about July 27, 2012, the district court issued its Second Partial Summary Dismissal
of Claims. Therein, among summarily dismissing other post-conviction claims, the Court
dismissed Mr. Severson’s claim of cumulative error finding, because only “one” issue remained
for evidentiary hearing (whether trial counsel was ineffective for prohibiting Mr. Severson from
testifying at trial and/or whether Mr. Severson’s constitutional right to testify was abridged by trial
counsel) there could not be “cumulative error.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.2, pp. 209-18.
Thereafter, the district court then held a three-day evidentiary hearing. Tr. 40769,
Evidentiary Hearing, Friday, September 7, 2012; Tr. 40769, Evidentiary Hearing, Wednesday,
September 19, 2-12; Tr. 40769, Evidentiary Hearing, Friday, October 5, 2012. The hearing was
limited to the claims remaining following entry of the district court’s two Orders of summary
dismissal. Tr. 40769, Evidentiary Hearing, Friday, September 7, 2012, at p. 5, l. 12 – p. 7, l. 8; Tr.
40769, Evidentiary Hearing, Friday, October 5, 2012, p. 152, ll. 5-8. Mr. Severson was precluded
from inquiring into any matter which the district court had previously summarily dismissed.
Following that hearing, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision Dismissing Post Conviction
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Action after Evidentiary Hearing. R. 45780-2018, Vol.2, pp. 261-86. On January 22, 2013, the
Court issued its Judgment with an attendant “Rule 54(b) Certificate.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.2,
pp. 287-88.
On or about February 28, 2013, Mr. Severson timely appealed from the Judgment.
R. 45780-2018, Vol.2, pp. 289-91. The Office of State Appellate Public Defender was appointed
to represent Mr. Severson on appeal. R. 45780-2018, Vol.2, pp. 294-95. A Conflict Appellate
Public Defender was appointed. Mr. Severson argued the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument based on the doctrine of res judicata and whether Mr.
Severson had raised a genuine issue of material fact in his clam that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the State’s closing argument.
On or about December 23, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion, on a petition
for review of the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision reversing the district court’s summary dismissal
of the claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object in closing argument.
Severson v. State, 159 Idaho 517, 363 P.3d 358 (2015) (“Severson II”). The Court vacated “the
district court’s summary dismissal of Severson’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel
relating to the alleged improper statements (by the prosecutor during closing argument) that were
not raised on direct appeal.” Id., at 522, 363 P.3d 363. Of note, the Court declined to “take it upon
itself to decide [whether Severson adequately raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning
this claim] on the record presented, the better course of action is to remand for the district court to
consider this question.” Id., 363 P.3d at 363. The Court also invited Mr. Severson to add any
potential claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when it stated: “This approach also
gives the district court the opportunity to address any claims Severson may present regarding
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appellate counsel’s failure to raise on direct appeal those statements which the dissent noted but
which the majority did not address.” Id., 363 P.3d at 363. The Supreme Court issued the Remittitur
on January 19, 2016. R. 45780-2018, Vol.2, p. 325.
Justice W. Jones filed a special concurrence and dissent in part in which Justice Pro Tem
Kidwell concurred. Justice W. Jones and Justice Pro Tem Kidwell had also dissented in the direct
appeal from Mr. Severson’s conviction and would have granted him a new trial based on
prosecutorial misconduct. See, Severson I, 147 Idaho at 723, 215 P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J.
dissenting). Again, Justice W. Jones emphasized “again that the prosecutor’s remarks, while
perhaps not all individually worthy of reversal, amounted to an unfair trial and fundamental error
when considered in the aggregate. I again note that the cumulative error doctrine supports a finding
of fundamental error in this case.” Severson II, 159 Idaho at 523, 363 P.3d at 364.
On or about March 9, 2016, this district court issued its Order Appointing Counsel for
Evidentiary Hearing on Remand and directed the Elmore County Public Defender “to find conflict
counsel to represent Mr. Severson at an evidentiary hearing on the issue remaining on remand to
the District Court related to ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object
to statements not addressed by the majority which are in the dissent of the direct appeal.” R. 457802018, Vol.2, pp. 362-28. On March 31, 2016, district court entered its Order Appointing Conflict
Public Defender. R. 45780-2018, Vol.1, p. 9.
Eventually, Mr. Severson filed a Third Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief (on Remand) (“Third Petition”).2 R. 45780-2018, Vol.4, pp. 514-38. The State filed its
Answer to the Third Amended Verified Petition. An evidentiary hearing on the Third Petition was

2

Mr. Severson had previously lodged with the district court a Second Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief; the district court refused to accept it as drafted and, for the purposes of the record, Mr. Severson determined
it was appropriate to label the Third Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as he did.
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held on or about August 16, 2017. Tr. 45780-2018, March 30, 2018. Eric Fredericksen, Mr.
Severson’s counsel on direct appeal testified. Id.
Pursuant to the schedule provided by the district court, on or about September 29, 2017,
Mr. Severson submitted the Petitioner’s Written Closing Argument Following Evidentiary
Hearing on Remand. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 793-812. On or about November 17, 2017, the
State submitted Respondent’s Written Closing Argument Following Evidentiary Hearing on
Remand. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 815-23. On or about December 7, 2017, Mr. Severson
submitted the Petitioner’s Written Rebuttal Closing Argument Following Evidentiary Hearing on
Remand. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 824-31.
On or about January 23, 2018, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision
Dismissing Post Conviction Petition After Evidentiary Hearing (on Remand). R. 45780-2018,
Vol.5, pp. 832-72. Therein, the district court denied Mr. Severson any relief and dismissed his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against both trial and appellate counsel. R. 45780-2018,
Vol.5, p. 869. On that same date, the district court issued its Final Judgment dismissing, with
prejudice, all claims raised by Mr. Severson in his Third Amended Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief [on Remand]. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 873.
On or about February 9, 2018, Mr. Severson filed his Notice of Appeal from the Final
Judgment. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp.875-80. The district court appointed the Idaho State Appellate
Public Defender to represent Mr. Severson in this appeal. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp.881-82. On or
about February 15, 2018, the Clerk’s Certificate of Appeal was filed. On or about March 2, 2018,
the Supreme Court entered its Order Augmenting Appeal, providing the record on appeal in this
matter be augmented to include the following: (1) “the Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s Transcripts
filed in prior appeal No. 40769, Severson v. State (Elmore County Case No. CV-2009-1408); and
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(2) “the Transcript of the Trial in State v. Severson, Elmore County CRFE-2002-158, previously
filed with this court in Supreme Court Docket No. 32128.”
C. Statement of Facts
A. Facts from Severson I.
The following facts are taken from the Court’s decision in Severson I:
Larry and Mary Severson met in Colorado in 1995. After dating for a little
over one year, the couple married and moved to Mountain Home, Idaho. By 2001,
Severson and Mary began experiencing marital problems. Then, in August 2001,
the couple separated after Mary learned that Severson was having an affair with a
younger woman. Upon learning of the affair, Mary left Severson and returned to
Colorado to stay with her
mother.
Initially, Mary and Severson planned on getting an uncontested divorce.
Less than four months after the couple separated, however, Mary changed her mind.
Instead of going forward with the divorce, Mary decided to return to Idaho and
work on her marriage. In the meantime, Severson continued to see his younger
girlfriend, Jennifer Watkins. Severson told Watkins that he and Mary were still
getting divorced and even asked Watkins to marry him. Watkins initially accepted
Severson's proposal but ended up breaking off the relationship before Mary
returned to Idaho.
Mary arrived back in Idaho in December 2001. Once she returned, she and
Severson went to the local GNC store so she could purchase some Hydroxycut pills.
Mary had started taking Hydroxycut while she was in Colorado in order to help her
lose weight. During that time, the pills did not cause her to suffer any adverse side
effects. Shortly after Mary began taking the pills she purchased with Severson,
however, she started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting blood. This prompted
Mary to inspect the pills and, upon doing so, she noticed that they were discolored
and warm to the touch. Mary immediately quit taking the pills and scheduled an
appointment with her doctor. At the doctor's office, Mary was diagnosed with an
ulcer and given a prescription for Prevacid. During a follow-up examination, she
also received a prescription for the sleep aid Ambien.
On February 14, 2002, Severson called Mary’s doctor and requested a refill
of Mary's Ambien prescription. The doctor authorized the refill and Severson
picked up the prescription later that same night. The next morning, at approximately
3:00 a.m., Severson purportedly discovered Mary lying on the couch not breathing.
Upon finding his wife, Severson called his son and daughter-in-law, Mike and
Nora, who immediately rushed to Severson's house. Once there, Nora called 911
and Mike began performing CPR on Mary. Before long, the paramedics arrived and
transported Mary to the hospital. Efforts to resuscitate Mary continued in the
ambulance and at the hospital, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Mary was
pronounced dead at the hospital at approximately 4:15 a.m. that same morning. An
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autopsy revealed that Mary had ingested significant amounts of the sleep aids
Ambien and Unisom, however, her cause of death was listed as "undetermined."
Less than one day passed before the police began investigating Severson’s
role in Mary’s death. Searches of Severson's home and workplace revealed several
pieces of evidence including a cardboard tray with broken pieces of Hydroxycut
capsules, a pharmacy receipt for Ambien, Ambien pills under a couch cushion
where Mary was discovered, a plastic baggie containing Unisom pills that was
hidden inside a hat with the word "dad" printed on it, Unisom tablets in Mary's
bathroom and car, and an empty Ambien prescription bottle. Additionally, two
bottles of Hydroxycut and an envelope containing some contaminated pills were
recovered from Severson's [civil] attorney, Jay Clark.
147 Idaho at 700-01, 215 P.3d at 420-21.
B. State’s Closing Argument.
Mr. Severson’s trial lasted seventeen (17) days. Severson I at 701, 215 P.3d at 421. Closing
arguments occurred on or about November 8, 2004. Tr. 32128, Vol.2, p. 3981-4146. During the
State’s closing argument, the prosecutor made the following improper statements,3 none which
were objected to by Mr. Severson’s trial counsel:
a. “Her [Mary’s] mouth opened easily. No one else in this courtroom has testified in
front of you, that was there, that they injured Mary Severson’s face.” Tr. 32128, p.
4136, ll. 14 – 17.
b. “It [the decision to return to Mountain Home in an attempt to save the marriage]
didn’t go over too well. On December 18th, she [Mary] came back for Christmas to
stay, left her mom’s house and came back, drove back for Christmas, her last
Christmas with her family.” Tr. 32128, p. 3983, ll. 6-10.
c. “During this time frame [when Mary is in Colorado with her mother] the defendant
is out gallivanting around with Jennifer. Some people are even saying, ‘Oh, I didn’t
know you had a daughter.’ ‘Well, it’s my fiancée.’ He says it’s his fiancée.”
Tr. 32128, p. 4001, ll. 11-15.
d. “And as the phone is ringing and as she [Nora Law] is talking to one of Mary’s
friends, Teresa Mallea, she is not breathing, she is not moving, “Come back to us,
Mary, come back to us.” Tr. 32128, p. 3986, ll. 10-13.
e. “So, Mary gets to come home in October to find that this 21-year-old tramp has
gone inside her house and painted her guest bathroom.” Tr. 32128, p. 4003, ll. 5-7.
3

These statements were identified as being improper by the dissent in Severson I.
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f. “Yeah, she [Mary] had some mild depression. Who wouldn’t, after finding out your
husband is screwing some 21-year-old, having an affair with some 21-year-old girl,
and you’re getting shipped back to Colorado. Who wouldn’t be a little depressed
about that, as a young woman?” Tr. 32128, p. 4039, l. 23-p. 4040, l. 3.
g. “Could that have happened? I suppose, in the same way that there are little green
aliens could be coming to us from Mars or something. It is possible in one way,
shape, or form that that’s exactly what somebody did.” Tr. 32128, p. 4052, ll. 2-6.
h. “I would love to talk to Mary Severson and find out, on the early-morning hours of
February 15th, how she was feeling. How did the meal make her feel? How did it
feel to go to dinner with her husband, and not be able to order the food you want?
… How many sleeping pills did she take? Why did she take them? If she took them,
did she know how many she took? I don’t get to do that. I don’t get to ask those
questions. Nobody does.” Tr. 32128, p. 4125, ll. 6-16.
i. “All we know is that according to Dr. Dawson, the State’s expert in this case – I
think a very credible individual, with nothing to lose in this matter – gave you a
good answer as to how he figured out the totals [number of pills ingested by Mary].”
Tr. 32128, p. 4125 16-21.
j. “Mike Severson didn’t see them [bruises on Mary’s face]. He wasn’t doing that
much. That’s force. That’s effort. That’s putting your hand, at least plausibly, in
somebody’s face and making sure the breath is out of there. And making sure you
have done the job right, because by God that woman just won’t die. She’s strong;
she is the strong one. Tr. 32128, p. 4058, ll. 9-15.
k. “Please don’t hold that fact, that Mr. Howen may have said she [Mr. Severson’s
girlfriend Jennifer] was nineteen instead of the ripe old age of 21. Or, she still looks
like she is about 19.” Tr. 32128, p. 4119, ll. 20-23.
l. “And I guess all the witnesses say that they saw Larry running around with a girl
they thought was his daughter, who was a teenager, who was all of age 18 or 19.
That may have been playing in his [the other prosecutor’s] mind.” Tr. 32128, p.
4119, l. 24-p. 4120, l. 3.
m. “We are done. Mr. Frachiseur and I, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Howen. Our job
here before you is complete. Innocent until proven guilty, yes. Today ends that
preposition. There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary
Severson. She didn’t have to die. The only reason she did was the lust and greed of
the defendant to get out of a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the
money and then some; and he could pursue his other women, not this fat woman
that he saw in front of him who refused to give him the divorce.” Tr. 32128, p.
4145, l. 24-p. 4146, l. 10.
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C. Direct Appeal.
Eric Fredericksen represented Mr. Severson in the appeal from his criminal conviction and
testified at the evidentiary hearing on remand. Tr. 45780-2018, p. 12, ll. 14-22. According to Mr.
Fredericksen, he identified “quite a bit of prosecutorial misconduct” in the trial record. Tr. 457802018, p. 14, ll. 17-18; p. 15, l. 4. Indeed, Mr. Fredericksen raised some instances of prosecutorial
misconduct on direct appeal. R. 45780-2018, Exhibit Vol.2, p. 160, pp. 247-55. He did not,
however, raise all issues identified as prosecutorial misconduct by the dissent in Severson I in the
briefing despite the fact a “cumulative error” argument was presented to the Court. R. 45780-2018,
Exhibit Vol.2, pp. 255-56. Additionally, Mr. Fredericksen failed to support a portion of the
argument for reversal of Mr. Severson’s conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct with either
argument or authority and, thus, the Court did not consider it. Severson I, 147 Idaho at 719 n.33,
215 P.3d at 439 n.33.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Severson’s Third Amended Verified Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief [on Remand] following an evidentiary hearing.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
As recently stated in Icanovic v. State:
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the applicant’s
allegations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. When appellate
review of a district court’s denial of post-conviction relief follows an evidentiary
hearing, rather than a summary dismissal, the evidence must be viewed most
favorably to the trial court’s findings. On review, this Court will not disturb the
district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. However, this
Court exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to
the facts. If a district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this
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Court will affirm the order upon the correct theory. Additionally, constitutional
issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.
159 Idaho 524, 528-29, 363 P.3d 365, 369-70 (2015) citing Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 16363, 321 P.3d 709, 713-14 (2014).
II. Argument
A. Applicable Standards.
1. Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act states, in relevant part: “Any person who has
been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims: That the conviction or the sentence
was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state”
can petition for relief. Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(1).
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho, 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing
but competent evidence is submitted to the jury.” State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho
463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P.
608, 611 (1903) ). Prosecutors, therefore, should not “exert their skill and ingenuity
to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so
doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused.” Id. Prosecutorial misconduct
occurs “[w]here [the] prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence[.]
State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 494, 399 P.3d 804, 821 (2017).
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3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Mr. Severson alleged both his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective
and that there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial and/or appeal would have been
different had his respective counsel not been ineffective. A defendant in a criminal case is
guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has been incorporated through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the individual states. Powell, 287 U.S. 45, 73
(1932).
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon state or federal
constitutional principles, is analyzed under the familiar and well-established standards set forth in
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999).
To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient in
that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and (2) this deficient
performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of
Strickland is satisfied if there is a reasonable probability a different result would have been
obtained had the attorney acted properly. Id. “[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome
determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair
or unreliable, is defective.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).
Although challenges to counsel’s “strategic” or “tactical” decisions will not generally
satisfy the first Strickland prong, simply labeling a decision “strategic” or “tactical” does not
insulate those decisions from review. The touchstone of any decision by trial counsel is
reasonableness: “The relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but
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whether they were reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000) (emphasis
added).
It is well settled that “even the best attorney may render ineffective assistance” on occasion.
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Winsor,
675 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1073 (D. Or. 2009). Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, criminal defendants have a right to counsel on appeal.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 388 (1985). Of course, the right to appellate counsel includes the
right to the effective assistance of that counsel. Id. at 396-97. Ineffective assistance by appellate
counsel violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
An ineffective appellate counsel claim requires proof of deficient performance and
prejudice. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998); Baxter v. State, 149
Idaho 859, 863, 243 P.3d 675, 679 (Ct. App. 2010). Counsel’s performance must fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness sufficient to show a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.” Mitchell at 277, 971 P.2d at 730 citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (emphasis added). Thus, the test to evaluate ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claims is the same familiar Strickland standard of deficient performance and
prejudice that governs ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Mitchell at 277, 971 P.2d at
730. The touchstone of a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is, of course,
reasonableness. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482.
B. The District Court Erred In Finding Certain Statements Were Considered On Direct
Appeal.
The district court incorrectly found two statements made by the prosecutor in closing
argument, which form the bases of some of Mr. Severson’s ineffective assistance of trial and
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appellate counsel claims, were considered on direct appeal. The prosecutor’s statements that the
district court found had been previously “considered” or determined are:
“[Mary’s] mouth opened easily. No one else in this courtroom has testified
in front you, that was there, that they injured Mary Severson’s face.”
“So, Mary gets to come home in October to find that this 21-year-old tramp
has gone inside her house and painted her guest bathroom.”
The district court abused its discretion in making its findings with regard to these statements.
“To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers whether
it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.” State v. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 504, 363 P.3d 339, 345 (2015) citing
Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 57, 44 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2002).
Although not utilizing the words “issue preclusion” or “res judicata,” the district court
nevertheless appears to have applied those concepts to some of Mr. Severson’s claims. Under
Idaho law, issue preclusion bars an issue from being relitigated if, inter alia, “the issue decided in
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action” and “the issue sought
to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation.” Severson II, 159 Idaho at 521, 363
P.3d at 362.
The district court found the Severson I Court’s analysis of the statement “[t]his is a
circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry. Nobody
knows, that has testified, what happened between them,” was, apparently, similar enough to the
statement “[Mary’s] mouth opened easily. No one else in this courtroom has testified in front you,
that was there, that they injured Mary Severson’s face” to warrant its finding that the “Supreme
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Court considered this statement on direct appeal.” Thus, the district court determined it
“[would]not reconsider the statement.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.4, p. 843.
The district court found the Severson I Court’s analysis of the statements “21-year-old
tramp” two months before Mary’s death and that he was “screwing some 21-year-old,” Severson
I, 147 Idaho at 720-21, 215 P.3d at 440-41, was sufficiently similar to the statement “So, Mary
gets to come home in October to find that this 21-year-old tramp has gone inside her house and
painted her guest bathroom” to warrant its finding that the second statement “was addressed on
direct appeal.” R. 45780-2017, Vol.4, p. 846-47. This is, simply, incorrect and an abuse of the
district court’s discretion.
The district court abused its discretion in its finding. Each statement referenced in this
section was identified by the dissent in Severson I but was not addressed by the majority opinion.
See Severson I, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of the
Third Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief must be reversed.
C. The District Court Erred In Concluding Statements It Found Constituted Prosecutorial
Misconduct Did Not Amount To Fundamental Error.
The district court found a remarkable number of instances of prosecutorial misconduct
during the State’s closing argument – five – but, inexplicably determined none of the misconduct
constituted fundamental error. R. 45780-2018. Vol.4, p. 851 (“[t]he Court finds the prosecutor’s
statement was improper and constituted error”); p. 854 (“the Court finds the statement[s] … were
improper as they serve no purpose but to enflame the passion and prejudice of the jury”); p. 854
(the Court incorporates its previous findings finding statement was made to enflame the passion
and prejudice of the jury); p. 857 (“Because the comment on Mary’s innocence was improper, the
Court finds the statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.”); and p. 858 (“the form of the
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prosecutor’s argument undoubtedly enflamed the passion and prejudice of the jury.”). The
offending statements are:
“All we know is that according to Dr. Dawson, the State’s expert in this case – I
think a very credible individual, with nothing to lose in this matter – gave you a
good answer as to how he figured out the totals [number of pills ingested by Mary].”
“Please don’t hold that fact, that Mr. Howen may have said she [Mr. Severson’s
girlfriend Jennifer] was nineteen instead of the ripe old age of 21. Or, she still looks
like she is about 19.”
“And I guess all the witnesses say that they saw Larry running around with a girl
they thought was his daughter, who was a teenager, who was all of age 18 or 19.
That may have been playing in his [the other prosecutor’s] mind.”
“There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary Severson.
She did not have to die.”
“The only reason she did [die] was the lust and greed of the defendant to get out of
a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the money and then some; and he
could pursue his other women, not this fat woman that he saw in front of him who
refused to give him a divorce.”
The district court erred.
“It is improper to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” State
v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133, 294 P.3d 1137, 1145 (Ct. App. 2013). “Indeed, the prosecutor
has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State
v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332 P.3d 767, 783 (2014). “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs
“[w]here [the] prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth
in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence[.]” Lankford, 162 Idaho at 494, 399 P.3d at 821.
Accordingly, the district court was correct in concluding the above-referenced statements
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. It erred, however, in its fundamental error analysis.
Prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental
error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
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prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing
the jury that the comments should be disregarded. The relevant question is whether
the prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.
Id. at 497, 399 P.3d at (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument will be considered a fundamental error when
it is “calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the
defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence.” State v. Ortiz, 148 Idaho 38, 42, 218 P.3d 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2009) citing
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997) and State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,
715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003).
Objectionable statements made during closing argument pose a special risk because they
are some of the last things jurors hear before retiring to deliberate. Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d
1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2015). “The presentation of improper material at the end of trial magnifies its
prejudicial effect because it is freshest in the mind of the jury when it retires to deliberate.” Id. at
1122; see also State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 42, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903).
Here, there is no dispute the prosecutor’s statements, which the district court deemed to be
prosecutorial misconduct, occurred during closing argument, or, worse, in rebuttal. Although the
district court correctly concluded the prosecutor committed misconduct in each of these five
instances, it apparently did not consider the fact the misconduct occurred in closing argument and
did not address the “special risk” it posed to Mr. Severson’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process.
The complained-of statements undoubtedly constitute fundamental error. Where a
prosecutor engages in a “relentless and blatant abuse of power,” Severson I, 147 Idaho at 732, 215
P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J. dissenting), for “the sole purpose of appealing to the passions of the

18

jury,” id., 215 P.3d at 443 (Jones, W., J. dissenting), fundamental error must be found. If not, it is
difficult to imagine what blatant acts of prosecutorial misconduct would.
Further, the district court mistakenly concluded some of these improper statements were
cured by the trial court’s jury instructions. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 851. In close cases, such as
Mr. Severson’s, standard jury instructions are not always sufficient to cure a prosecutor’s
misconduct. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 575 (9th Cir. 2004). In fact, even where a
timely objection is made, a “quick statement that ‘the jury will disregard’” the prosecutor’s
comment is oftentimes insufficient to cure improper vouching. United States v. Alcantara-Castillo,
788 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court erred and should be reversed.
D. The District Court Erred In Concluding The Prosecutor’s Comment On Mr. Severson’s
Fifth Amendment Right To Silence Did Not Constitute Fundamental Error.
The district court found the statement “[Mary’s] mouth opened easily. No one else in this
courtroom has testified in front of you, that was there, that they injured Mary Severson’s face”
“did not constitute fundamental error.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.4, p. 843. The district court erred.
Pursuant to the U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV, as well as Idaho CONST. Art. 9, §
13, no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. “It is clearly
erroneous for a prosecutor to introduce evidence of the defendant’s postarrest silence for the
purpose of raising an inference of guilt.” State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 591, 671 P.2d 1051,
1054 (1983) citing State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976) and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Likewise, it is erroneous for the “prosecutor to comment to the jury on the
defendant’s failure to testify at trial.” Hodges, 105 Idaho at 591, 671 P.2d at 1054 citing Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The prosecutor is forbidden from “either direct or indirect
comment upon the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand. The rule, however, does not
extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce
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material evidence or call logical witnesses.” Hodges, 105 Idaho at 592, 671 P.2d at 1055 quoting
People v. Jackson, 618 P.2d 149, 169 (Cal. 1980).
The district court relied on the Severson I Court’s analysis of the statement “[t]his is a
circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry. Nobody
knows, that has testified, what happened between them” in support of its analysis. R. 45780, Vol.4,
p. 842-43 (original italics). The district court’s analysis is fatally flawed, however, because it
ignores a critical passage in the Severson I Court’s analysis of the previously raised statement. The
Severson I Court specifically based its conclusion concerning the previously challenged statement
on the fact that “the statement was a single, isolated comment.” Severson I, 147 Idaho 719, 215
P.3d at 439.
Given the actual fact there was not one, but, two comments on Mr. Severson’s right to
remain silent, it was error for the district court to rely on the Severson I Court’s analysis of the
issue. Instead, the district court should have conducted a new, independent analysis, taking into
consideration the fact the prosecutor made multiple comments on Mr. Severson’s right to remain
silent. It did not, and it erred.4
E. The District Court Erred In Concluding Certain Statements Did Not Constitute
Prosecutorial Misconduct.
The district court concluded numerous statements by the prosecutor during closing
argument did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. For example, it found the statement “And
as the phone is ringing and as she [Nora Law] is talking to one of Mary’s friends, Teresa Mallea,
she is not breathing, she is not moving, ‘Come back to us Mary, come back to us’” was not
prosecutorial misconduct. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 845-46. The district court also concluded the
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As argued later, by failing to raise the now-challenged statement on direct appeal, appellate counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, and Mr. Severson was prejudiced.
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statement “You have a difficult decision to make. There’s people in this courtroom who have been
here the entire time that you have heard from. Mary Severson isn’t a body. Mary Severson isn’t a
picture of bruises.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 862-63. It erred.
Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. “Prosecutors … should not exert their skill and ingenuity
to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, because generally in so doing they
transgress upon the rights of the accused. Lankford, 162 Idaho at 494, 399 P.3d at 821 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
The district court properly found the prosecutor’s statement “[c]ome back to us, Mary,
come back to us” was not included in the evidence submitted to the jury. It, however, erroneously
classified it as a “slight misstatement” of the evidence resulting in it being harmless error. R.
45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 846. Given the fact the Severson I Court found comments by the prosecutor
concerning Mary “speaking from her grave” to be “somewhat inflammatory,” 147 Idaho at 71920, 215 P.3d at 439-40, the district court’s failure to classify the now-challenged statement as
another such statement by the prosecutor is an abuse of discretion. It should go without saying:
The more the prosecutor “trespassed on the verge of error” by using language akin to the victim
“speaking from the grave,” the more likely it is for Mr. Severson’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to a fair trial to be violated.
The prosecutor improperly and impermissibly pointed the jury to Ms. Severson’s family in
a blatant appeal to the jury’s passion and prejudice. The district court found the statement “was
designed to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury,” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 31, and that
the statement “was … inflammatory to point out that the family sat through the trial and were
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awaiting the jury’s verdict,” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 32. Such statements amount to prosecutorial
misconduct because, by making such statements, the prosecutor is seeking to obtain a conviction
in violation of Mr. Severson’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227,
245 P.3d at 979.
The district court also found the statements “Could [somebody else have tampered with
the Hydroxycut bottle]? I suppose, in the same way that there are little green aliens could be
coming to us from Mars or something. It is possible in one way, shape, or form that that’s exactly
what somebody did,” fell outside of “the recognized exceptions permitting latitude in making
closing argument.” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 848. Therefore, the district court should have
concluded the statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct. It did not. It erred.
If this Court presumes, based on its further analysis the district court did find the statement
was prosecutorial misconduct, its conclusion that Mr. Severson failed to satisfy his burden of
demonstrating the failure to object as not due to “inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or
other shortcoming surrounding trial defense counsel’s performance,” R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p.
848, was erroneous.
Simply classifying trial counsel’s failure to object as “strategic” or “tactical” does not end
the inquiry. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482. Instead, the district was required to analyze
whether trial counsel’s failure to object was reasonable.” Id. The district court did not do so
because, in light of all of the other statements constituting prosecutorial misconduct, such a
conclusion could not stand.
As the district court found, both of Mr. Severson’s trial counsel are deceased. R. 45780,
Vol.5, p. 841. Given, however, trial counsel’s abject failure to object to multiple statements the
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district court found constituted prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. Severson contends he satisfied his
burden concerning the offending statement.
F. The District Court Erred In Concluding There Was No Cumulative Error Because Of
Trial Counsel’s Failure To Object To Statements Which It Found Constituted
Prosecutorial Misconduct.
The district court determined that, because it did not find any fundamental error, the
cumulative error doctrine did not afford Mr. Severson any relief. R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, pp. 86364.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one
error.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982 (internal citations omitted). In order for unobjected-to
errors to be considered under the cumulative error doctrine, they need to satisfy the fundamental
error doctrine. Id., 245 P.3d at 982.
As demonstrated above, the district court erred in failing to conclude the prosecutorial
misconduct it identified did not constitute fundamental error. Because the district court erred in so
concluding, it also erred in determining there was no cumulative error. There were and Mr.
Severson should be afforded relief.
The prosecutor’s “relentless and blatant abuse of power” can, and in this case, did, violate
Mr. Severson’s due process right to a fair trial under the United States Constitution. Here, the
prosecutor’s misconduct, coming during closing argument and rebuttal “so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Parker v. Matthews, 567
U.S. 37, 45 (2012). This standard was, or should have been, well known to trial counsel at the time
of Larry’s trial. It was first announced in 1974 and reaffirmed as the standard in 1986. Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416, U.S. 637 (1974); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 161, 181 (1986).
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“The role of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done. It is as much a prosecutor’s duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
There were multiple fundamental errors committed during the prosecutor’s closing
argument in Mr. Severson’s trial. The district court erred in concluding otherwise. Further, the
district court erred in concluding cumulative error during Mr. Severson’s trial did not result in a
trial that was fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
G. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Object To The Prosecutor’s “Relentless And Blatant Abuse Of
Power” Satisfies The Strickland Standard. Mr. Severson Received Ineffective Assistance
Of Trial Counsel.
The district court found “[a] review of the statements found to be inflammatory together
does show the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Therefore, the
Court does find counsel was deficient for failing to object to the accumulated inflammatory
statements.” The district court concluded, however, Mr. Severson suffered no prejudice because
each of the individual statements it deemed improper would not have changed the outcome of the
trial. See, e.g., R. 45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 851 (“Severson failed to show … the outcome of
Severson’s trial was prejudiced.”). The district court erred.
“[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to
whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.”
Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369.
By myopically focusing on whether trial counsel’s failure to object to the statements the
district court found amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, the district court’s analysis ran afoul of

24

the warning in Lockhart. Mr. Severson’s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair because of the
prosecutor’s misconduct during closing argument. Therefore, Mr. Severson was prejudiced.
H. The District Court Erred In Concluding Mr. Severson Is Not Entitled To Relief On His
Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel.
1. The district court erred in dismissing Mr. Severson’s ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim for the failure to raise all instances of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal.
The district court found “appellate counsel was deficient” for failing to raise, on appeal,
three of the statements the district court concluded amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. R.
45780-2018, Vol.5, p. 867. Because it incorrectly concluded that the statements did not amount to
fundamental error, the district court found Mr. Severson suffered no harm. Id. Again, the district
court erred.
As set forth above the district court erroneously concluded five statements it determined
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct did not also constitute fundamental error. Because of this
error, the district court erroneously dismissed Mr. Severson’s claim for relief based on the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
2. The district court erred in dismissing Mr. Severson’s ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim for the failure to support an appellate issue with argument
or authority.
The district court correctly concluded appellate counsel’s performance was deficient for
failing to support, with argument or authority, the argument that the following statement amounted
to prosecutorial misconduct:
“We are done. Mr. Frachiseur and I, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Howen. Our job
here before you is complete. Innocent until proven guilty, yes. Today ends that
preposition. There is no innocence in this courtroom except the innocence of Mary
Severson. She didn’t have to die. The only reason she did was the lust and greed of
the defendant to get out of a marriage rather than divorce so he could get all the
money and then some; and he could pursue his other women, not this fat woman
that he saw in front of him who refused to give him the divorce.”
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It is well settled: any issue before Idaho appellate courts not supported with argument and
authority will not be considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996). Mr.
Fredericksen freely admitted he failed to support the statement with either argument or authority
and, more importantly, that he was familiar with Zichko at the time he worked on Mr. Severson’s
direct appeal. Tr. 45780-2018, p. 38, l. 10-p. 39, l. 6. Of course, the Severson I Court refused to
consider the statement on direct appeal. Severson I, 147 Idaho at 719 n.33, 215 P.3d 439.
The district court, however, erred in determining Mr. Severson suffered no prejudice on appeal. R.
45689-2018, Vol.5, p. 868. Again, the district court based its conclusion on the fact it found no
fundamental error. Id. at p. 869. As set forth above, the district erred in failing to conclude the
prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental error and that Mr. Severson suffered prejudice.
According, the district court’s conclusion here is incorrect and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s Final Judgment, dismissing, with
prejudice, all claims in the Third Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (On
Remand) must be reversed and Mr. Severson awarded a new trial.
There were multiple fundamental errors arising from prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument. Trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s blatant trampling on Mr.
Severson’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to do so. Mr. Severson suffered prejudice because of trial counsel’s deficient performance.
Additionally, Mr. Severson is entitled to a new trial by virtue of appellate counsel’s
ineffective assistance which resulted in prejudice in Mr. Severson’s appeal.
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DATED this 2nd day of October 2018.

Kormanik & Sneed LLP
/s/ John R. Kormanik
John R. Kormanik
Counsel for Larry M. Severson
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